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Capital Neutrality and Coordinated
Supervision: Lessons for
International Securities Regulation
from the Law of International
Taxation and Banking
Charles Thelen Plambeck*
INTRODUCTION
In international finance, the words globalization and internationalization de-
scribe the processes by which independent national financial markets become
integrated into a single dominant world market. These processes are altering the
assumptions upon which domestic securities laws are premised, particularly
assumptions about the nature of the domestic market and the pertinence of
foreign laws. One of the consequences of these processes is that market partici-
pants are able to surmount domestic regulatory restrictions with little difficulty.
Globalized and internationalized markets therefore challenge securities au-
thorities to enact regulations which are both cogent and operative. This article
studies the experiences of international tax and banking law and extracts princi-
ples which may be applied when defining the appropriate relationship among
United States securities laws, foreign securities laws, and a global economy.
Part I of this article provides some background on the legal forces which have
influenced globalization and internationalization of the world's securities mar-
kets. Part II focuses on the international tax law principle of capital neutrality.
Fundamentally, the principle of capital neutrality requires that regulations should
not unintentionally direct the movement of capital. Part II analyzes the bases and
parameters of the principle of capital neutrality, the experiences of international
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (International), Internal Revenue Service.
A.B. 1983, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1986 University of North Carolina School of Law. The
Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, and the Treasury Department (collectively,
The "Office"), as a matter of policy, disclaim responsibility for the private publications of Office
employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views or policy of the Office, or the views of the author's colleagues on the Office staff.
This article was prepared prior to the author's joining the Staff of the Office and has not been
reviewed by the office for technical or substantive accuracy.
172 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS
taxation in applying the principle to a globalizing economy, and the possibilities
for applying the principle to international securities regulation.
Part III focuses on the international banking law principle of coordinated
supervision. The principle of coordinated supervision is that no bank should go
unsupervised, and that the supervision of banks must be adequate. Part III exam-
ines the historical impetus for coordinated supervision, the development of the
principle, and its recent application to problems caused by globalization. Part III
concludes with suggestions for the possible application of the principle to se-
curities law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Globalization and Internationalization
Securities regulators are currently examining the U.S. securities laws as they
relate to the latest stage of development of international financial markets,I that of
internationalization: the increasing participation of issuers and investors of one
country in the securities markets of other countries. 2 While investment in foreign
capital markets has long been practiced, the volume and frequency of interna-
tional financial transactions since the 1960s is qualitatively distinct.3
In addition to economic, political, institutional, 4 and technological' forces,
1. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITIE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, (1987) [hereinafter
SEC REPORT]. Internationalization Report Sent to the Congress by SEC Staff, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1187 (August 7, 1987).
2. Of the many neologisms introduced in our living language, the creation of the words globalize,
globalization, internationalize, and internationalization usefully describes the current changes in the
political economy. The reason for creating the verbs globalize and internationalize from their root
nouns is to contain in one word what would require many words to explain. Unfortunately, the words
are also "vogue words", used as substitutes for any of several more precise words, and thus encapsu-
late many imprecise meanings as well as many concepts. FOWLER, MODERN ENGLISH USAGE at 389,
460, 684 (1983).
3. See Thomas, Internationalization of Securties Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 155 (1981).
4. Securities markets around the world are changing as foreign issuers expand their use of United
States capital markets, domestic issuers access foreign markets, and both debt and equity offerings
are made multinationally. Institutional changes in the market structure brought about by interna-
tionalization pose new regulatory problems for the Commission. United States distribution systems
are distinct from those existing in other countries. See Langevoort, Information Technology and the
Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) (describing institutional framework
in the United States); Schneider, Going Public: Practice, Procedures, and Consequences, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1981) (detailing steps in going public). Many variations of distribution techniques are
found in the world's capital markets. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at Chapter III, Part IV
(comparative analysis). The framework commonly used in Euromarket offerings is similar to that of
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internationalization of the securities markets had been significantly fueled by
regulatory forces. 6 The latest era in internationalization of the securities markets
can be traced to the 1960s with the maturity of the Eurocurrency markets7 and the
emergence of the Eurobond markets.' Eurocurrency markets are markets for
deposit liabilities denominated in currencies traded outside their respective econ-
omies. Eurocurrency deposits are not subject to U.S. banking regulations, and
consequently they have flourished.9 Eurobonds are bonds issued by borrowers
outside of the restrictions that apply to domestic offerings. 0 Eurocurrency depos-
its formed a ready pool of capital to finance Eurobonds.
The Eurobond market emerged, at a time of fixed exchange rates, as a result of
the Interest Equalization Tax of 1964, I the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint
the United Kingdom, though syndication structures change with new strategies and problems. See
Grant, Mapping a Route Through the Euromarket Chaos, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1986, at 29. See also
Dual Approaches to Dual Tranches, Selling Equities to the World, EUROMONEY & CORP. FIN. SuPP.,
Nov. 1986 at 25. Where simultaneous offerings are made, the incompatibility of systems of delivery
(not to mention different regulatory requirements), require accommodation of the procedure of both
systems. See Pryor, Dual Public Offerings in the UK and the US, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1985, at
16.
5. Technological innovations reduce information and transaction costs, and enable the creation of
new products. See Langevoort, supra note 4. See also TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1984). [hereinafter TASK GROUP]. See Information Technology:
A Leap in the Dark?, EUROMONEY Supp., Aug. 1987.
6. See Fallon, Adams & Ollard, The Great Deregulation Explosion, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1984, at
55 [hereinafter Fallon]. The removal of restrictions on foreign participation by many of the world's
securities markets is a primary influence.
7. The origin of the Eurocurrency markets, is difficult to trace. Following World War 11, European
banks accommodated the Soviet Union's wishes to deposit its dollar holdings outside the U.S. HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., THE OPERATION OF
U.S. BANKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 7-8 (Comm. Print 1979). [hereinafter
"Comm. Print"]. United States balance of payment deficits since the 1950s and higher interest rates
abroad caused flow of the dollar overseas, providing a supply of dollars for the Eurocurrency market.
Id. at 8. See Curtin, Now It's Grown Up, It's Fierce, EUROMONEY, June, 1984, at 64. See also, Sesit,
Prosperity and Peril in the Brave New Market, Wall St.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 40D.
8. See KERR, HISTORY OF THE EUROBOND MARKET (1984); Curtin, supra note 7.
9. U.S. banks avoided Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1982), which put a ceiling on the interest
rates U.S. banks could offer domestic depositors by taking deposits in their foreign affiliates.
International Bank Lending and the Securities Market, WORLD BANK DEv. REP. 1985 (The World
Bank) 114 [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. When, beginning in 1963, the U.S. imposed a series
of exchange controls intended to limit the growth of foreign lending, the foreign branches, not subject
to the ceilings, took deposits and lent on them.
10. Eurobonds are to be distinguished from foreign bonds, which are issued by foreign borrowers
in a nation's capital markets and usually are denominated in that nation's currency. Salwen, Terms of
Investment for Novices in the Overseas Markets, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 13D.
II. Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809, (repealed 1974). The United States imposes a tax of 30% on
dividends, interest, and other investment income received by foreign persons from U.S. sources. 26
U.S.C. §§ 871(a), 881 (1982). Because this tax is collected by withholding by the person making the
payment to the foreign person, it is often called the withholding tax. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (1982).
Under the Interest Equalization Tax (IET) interest on certain debt obligations which were part of an
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Program of 1965,12 and the Credit Control Act of 1969.11 These initiatives were
designed to improve the U.S.'s balance of payments deficit by discouraging
foreign and domestic issuers from raising money in the U.S., thereby reducing
the outflow of capital. 14 In addition to the creation of the Eurobond market, many
European capital markets were reopened or reinvigorated by U.S. demand for
foreign capital.
When the U.S. allowed the value of the dollar to be determined by market
forces following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the Interest
Equalization Tax and other supporting methods were allowed to expire. Though
Eurobond offerings decreased, 5 the Euromarkets played a significant role in
issue with respect to which an election had been made for lET purposes were exempt from withhold-
ing tax. 26 U.S.C. § 861(a)(l)(G), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1988); Id. § 4912(c)
(as in effect before July I, 1974) (repealed 1974). U.S. borrowers were able to secure an exemption
from the withholding tax for foreign lenders by electing to have the U.S. obligation subject to the
lET.
12. Act of Sept. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-175, 79 Stat. 672 (1965).
13. Pub. L. No. 91-151, 83 Stat. 376, (authority under the Act terminated 1982).
14. The securities laws also encouraged capital outflow. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 564, (1964)(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78)
(authorizing Commission to exempt securities of foreign issuers). See also Summary of the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964, Securities Act Release No. 4725, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 77,127 (Sept. 15, 1964) (also released as Release No. 34-7425) (summarizing
changes of the 1964 Act); Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act
Release No. 4708, [1 Topical Index] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-63 (July 9, 1964) (describing
efforts to encourage foreign offerings) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 4708].
15. Previously U.S. companies were encouraged to borrow overseas by a change in the ruling
policy of the IRS which encouraged foreign borrowing through finance subsidiaries, outlining stan-
dards which, if met, would assure that no withholding tax would apply to foreign borrowing. The IRS
issued rulings recognizing certain entities and not applying withholding tax. Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1
C.B. 454; Rev. Rul. 72-416, 1972-2 C.B. 591; Rev. Rul. 70-645, 1970-2 C.B. 273; Rev. Rul. 69-501,
1969-2 C.B. 233; Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1969-2 C.B. 231. These rulings were revoked, however, upon the
expiration of the Interest Equalization Tax, Rev. Rul. 74-464, 1974-2, C.B. 46., causing considerable
uncertainty in the availability of exemption from withholding and decrease in Eurobond offerings tax.
Almost immediately, legislative proposals were offered which would have repealed the withholding
tax on portfolio investments. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 93D CONG., 2D
SEES., U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS AND THE
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION PROVISIONS 7 (Comm. Print 1975).
It was argued that an exemption for bank deposits held by foreigners should be retained since
amounts on deposits in bank accounts could very easily be transferred out of the U.S. into foreign
bank accounts. This argument recognized the fungibility of money and the ease with which financial
transactions can be diverted.
A further argument advanced in 1974 for exemption of interest and dividends was that it would
encourage other recycling of OPEC dollars. Most oil dollars were owned by foreign governments,
which could invest in the United States without paying tax under then existing law. A consideration
for world stability is that the OPEC capital flows were widely disbursed among markets in the oil
importing nations. The balanced pattern of the OPEC investments prevented any financial crises
which could have resulted if the funds were not widely and broadly invested. This offers another
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recycling of petrodollars to assist the oil importing developing countries balance
of payments. 16
Significantly, though the Unites States financial regulations of the depression
era of the 1930s remained as legal barriers to financial liberalization, the ease of
access to the unregulated Euromarkets allowed defacto deregulation. 7 For exam-
ple U.S. commercial banks, prohibited in the U.S. by the Glass-Steagall Act"
from engaging in investment banking, could operate free from this restriction in
the Euromarkets. The existence and success of the Euromarkets, therefore, has
been a major catalyst of the deregulation of U.S. banking 9 and securities20 laws.
The sovereign debt crisis of 1982 brought an end to the petrodollar recycling
era and introduced securitization and globalization to financial flows. 2' The Eu-
ronote began to replace the syndicated loan as the chief vehicle of Euromarket
short term finance, as investors shifted their funds away from interbank deposits
and into securities issued by top quality corporate and government issuers. 22 The
innovation of the Euromarkets in securitizing bank assets 23 and in designing
argument for nonpreferential treatment. See I.R.C. § 892; Rev. Rul. 75-298, 1975-2 C.B. 290
(broadening exemption for foreign governments). These arguments were ultimately unpersuasive to
the Congress which merely made permanent the exemption on interest of foreign bank accounts.
16. Koenig, Into the Maelstrom, EUROMONEY, June 1987, at 67, 68. Curtin, supra note 7, at 66.
17. The fissure of the tax barriers to access to the Euromarkets by U.S. firms was the Netherlands
Antilles Treaty. The U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-
Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No 1855, modified and supplemented by Protocol Respecting
Double Taxation, June 15, 1955, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366 and
Protocol Respecting Double Taxation, Oct. 23, 1963, United States -Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900,
T.I.A.S. No 5665 (recently terminated). Article VIII of that treaty could be applied to claim exemp-
tion from U.S. withholding tax on the interest payments by the U.S. parent and affiliates of the
Antilles finance subsidiary. U.S companies could establish financing subsidiaries which would re-
ceive favorable tax treatment on debt issued abroad. The debt could be issued without registration
with the Commission under Release No. 4708, supra note 14.
18. 12 U.S. C. §§ 24, 378 (Supp. 1988).
19. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94
Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.(Supp. 1988)). The Act
was designed to reduce regulation of U.S. financial institutions. See Clarke, Regulations Handicap
U.S. Banks in Global Market, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 1986, at 4; Forrestal, How Much Regulation Is
Necessary for a Sound Financial System?, AM. BANKER, Feb. 10, 1987, at 4; Corrigan, Corrigan's
Proposal to Reshape the Financial Services Industry, AM. BANKER, Feb. 2, 1987, at 10.
Under existing regulations at least some regulation is necessary. Because deposits of many institu-
tions are insured or protected by the government, regulations must be imposed by the government to
prevent high risk activities that a truely free market would not support.
20. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78, 80).
21. Koenig, supra note 16, at 68. See also From the Flames, A New Market, EUROMONEY, Sept.
1987, at 71-72.
22. Shirreff, The Euronote Explosion, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1984, at 31.
23. See Logan, The Securitization of U.S. Bank Activities in the Eurodollar Market, 11 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 539 (1986).
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financing vehicles to suit issuers24 assured the continued existence of the
Euromarkets.
The U.S. regulatory changes significantly influenced changes in other coun-
tries. Throughout the 1980s many other financial centers have restructured their
financial laws. 25 The simultaneous liberalization throughout the world of markets
and institutions is resulting in the coalescing of the major capital markets of the
world into one global market.26 This process is known as globalization. No
longer is the market measured by national boundaries.27 The growth since 1983 of
an international marketplace for equity financing (Euroequities) decisively marks
the emergence of a truly global capital market.2 8
The political climate of the 1980s is in part responsible for the flourishing of
globalization. It is possible that as the political climate changes protectionism
might generate unpredictable countertides to globalization, inhibiting the free
flow of capital across national boundaries. 2 9 One of the challenges of regulators is
to resist protectionist pressures which could negatively impact the world
economy. 30
B. Regulatory Strategies in a Global Economy
Globalization and internationalization have important implications for national
legal systems. The laws and policies of nations intersect in areas of international
economic activity. Thus, as internationalization has progressed, nations in-
24. The Eurobond Market: A Cradle of Creativity, EUROMONEY Supp., Jan. 1986.
25. Japan eliminated exchange controls, as did the U.K. Deregulation of commission rates in the
U.S. (and the resultant reduction in transaction costs) exerted pressure on other markets directly, from
enhanced competition, and indirectly, from examples of salutary results. See Fallon, supra note 6, at
57-59.
26. Id. at 55. The One World Capital Market, The Euromoney Financing Guide, EUROMONEY,
Oct. 1984, at 106. Cohen, Toward an International Securities Market, in 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECURrIES REGULATION 2 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1986 rev.). U.S. tax laws remain a
partial obstacle to complete integration. See Newburg, U.S. Companies and International Law, 20
INT'L LAW. 765 (1986).
27. It is becoming increasingly clear that economic dynamics have decisively shifted from the
national economy to the world economy. Prevailing economic theory considers national economies to
be virtually autonomous from the world economy, and uses the national economy as the unit of both
economic analysis and economic policy. One observer has attributed the economic success of Japan
and West Germany to the priority their policymaking gives to the world economy rather than the
national economy. Drucker, The Changed World Economy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 768, 791 (1986) (also
noting that government policies succeed when they try to harmonize capital movements with move-
ments of goods and services).
28. See generally Selling Equities to the World, EUROMONEY & CORP. FIN. SupF., Nov. 1986.
29. Koenig, supra note 16, at 67, 79. See Debs, Globalization of Financial Markets: "What Is
Happening and Why", 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 198 (May 1987) (Trend is regulation, deregulation, self-
regulation, re-regulation.).
30. Famsworth, Global Crunch: Can Nations Set Aside Their Parochialism in Time?, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1987, § 4, at I.
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creasingly have been confronted with the circumstance where two nations con-
currently assert jurisdiction to regulate a single series of transactions but seek to
apply differing and mutually inconsistent regulatory policies. The evolving con-
cepts of jurisdiction3' and limiting principles 32  have been shaped by
internationalization.
Globalization also requires the evaluation of the current structure of securities
regulation, 33 and suggests that the new realities should be addressed. Although
the U.S. system of securities regulation currently is oriented toward a national
market for securities,3 4 economic dynamics appear to have shifted decisively
3 1. An early example of the relation of United States laws in a globalizing economy is the evolution
of the effects doctrine. Early formulations of jurisdiction were strictly territorial. See The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. 478,481, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812). In the post World War It era, as
United States economic dominance emerged, the courts formulated the effects doctrine of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, which extends United States jurisdiction to acts or conduct with effects in the
United States, even though that conduct occurs outside the United States. See United States v.
ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
32. Such as forum non conveniens. See Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of
a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1986).
33. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1. See also McLaughlin, 1933 Act's Registration Provisions: Is
Time Ripe for Repealing Them?, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 44 ("the developing internationaliza-
tion of the securities markets has created tension between the regulation domestic market and the
"unregulated" Eurodollar market").
34. One outmoded assumption is that the unit of regulation is a national versus a global market.
Another assumption is the position of the United States as a capital importer or exporter. The
experience of taxation suggests that the economic position of the United States must be considered.
The United States currently faces a pressing external debt. Capital inflows should not be burdened by
unnecessary regulation. The United States' repeal of the withholding tax on portfolio interest is a
recognition of economic reality. The Commission's proposal of a more precisely and narrowly
defined territorial approach may be understood as a correlative effort to facilitate access to interna-
tional capital markets by United States issuers. Likewise, the Commission's difficulty in formulating
an approach to facilitating access to United States capital markets by foreign issuers is analogous to
the tax law's absence of encouraging foreign investment in a manner comparable to the repeal of
withholding.
The economic position of the United States has had a significant impact on the contours of United
States tax law in the past. In the late 1950s, the highly adverse U.S. balance of payments led to
considerable pressure for revised international tax policy. See generally Note, The U.S. As a Debtor
Nation, 23 STAN J. INT'L L. I (1987). The particular economic circumstances facing the Kennedy
Administration gave the 1961 proposals their shape. The Kennedy Administration proposals were
centered on the elimination of deferral for U.S. controlled foreign corporations (except for less
developed country corporations). Not only did the 1962 Act make basic legislative changes, but its
legislative history established the charter for administrative work that set the agenda for the Treasury
Department for several years.
Economic circumstances again influenced the proposals for the revision of the tax treatment of
foreign persons, principally with respect to U.S. source income, and resulted in the Foreign Investors
Tax Act of 1966.
In that Act, Congress provided that the special treatment accorded to U.S. bank deposits of foreign
persons should be terminated because there was no reason to treat the interest income on these
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from the national economy to the global economy. 35 To a great extent, changes in
world markets already have outpaced the existing regulatory strategies, creating a
distinctive set of problems to which the legal systems of the world must respond
by employing new regulatory strategies. 36
Regulatory solutions are made difficult by the nature of international capital
flows. The volume of trading of financial instruments and the speed at which
information is transmitted can undermine regulatory efforts. Unilateral attempts
to restrict business result only in business being diverted.37 For example, interest
rate and currency swaps effectively arbitrage away currency restrictions and
interest rate differentials between capital markets, loosening the control of cen-
tral banks over domestic financial systems. 38 In fact, swaps actually exploit
different regulatory and market conditions. 3 A recent proposal to impose a
securities transfer tax was abandoned largely because the facility with which the
identical transaction could be executed on a foreign exchange free from the tax. 40
deposits as not being from U.S. sources and thereby allowing the interest to escape U.S. taxation. At
the same time, however, it was believed that an immediate elimination of the special rules for the
treatment of these bank deposits might have a substantial adverse effect on the U.S. balance of
payments. Consequently, congress decided to postpone the elimination of the special rules until the
end of 1972. At the scheduled expiration, the U.S. balance of payments deficit continued. Congress
decided to further postpone the removal of the special treatment provided for U.S. bank deposits of
foreign persons until the end of 1975. Fears of massive withdrawals of foreign capital from U.S.
banks prompted a permanent extention of this special treatment of interest paid foreigners. H.R. REP.
No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 130 (1969).
35. Drucker, supra note 27.
36. For example since 1980, the Treasury Department has attempted to renegotiate the U.S. tax
treaty with the Netherlands Antilles to prevent U.S. and foreign investors from abusing the current
treaty and bank secrecy laws in the Netherlands Antilles. Similar negotiations with the British Virgin
Islands concluded unsuccessfully in 1982, and Treasury subsequently terminated the BVI Treaty.
Fearing that the termination of the Netherlands Antilles treaty was imminent, the U.S. borrowers
confronted Congress with a major policy choice which reflected how it would respond to the
existence of the unregulated Euromarkets. Congress accepted the arguments rejected earlier and
decided to eliminate withholding tax on portfolio interest. Treasury later partially terminated the
treaty. See Rosen, Treasury's Blunder in Paradise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987 § 2, at 1. The great
pressures involved illustrate the limits of power of regulators in a global economy.
37. Another example of unilateral action recently which has failed to become established is the
SEC's "waiver by conduct" proposal. See Request for Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve
the Commission's Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in the
U.S. Markets from Other Countries, Exchange Act Release No. 21186, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,648 (July 30, 1984) ("waiver by conduct" concept). See also Fedders,
Interdependence & Cooperation: The SEC's "Waiver by Conduct" Concept Release, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Sept. 1984, at 10.
38. Fallon, supra note 6, at 57. See generally Henderson, An Analysis of Interest Rate and
Currency Swaps, II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 497 (1986).
39. Ford, Global Banking, Financial Integration Major Conference Themes, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP., Jul-Aug 1987, at 26. See generally Swaps - New Moves, EUROMONEY
Supl., July 1987; The International Options Market, EUROMONEY Supp., June 1986.
40. Proposed recently by Representative Jim Wright.
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Another aspect of the regulatory problems associated with globalization is that
regulatory developments in one country affect regulatory developments in an-
other country. For example, the elimination in 1984 by the U.S. of withholding
tax on certain foreign investments led immediately to the abolition of the equiv-
alent West Germany and Japanese withholding tax. 4' Nations whose regulations
are out of step face losing the business. Thus there has been a competitive bid-
down of regulations among nations to retain or attract the financing business. 41
At a more fundamental level, the challenge that confronts regulators in re-
sponse to further growth and integration of international securities markets is to
develop a global regulatory framework that preserves the efficiencies associated
with international capital mobility.43 It widely recognized that financial markets
play a critical role in the economic development of capitalist societies. 44 Ineffi-
ciencies in capital markets slow this development. As international finance has
become a prominent part of national financial markets, pressure has increased on
nations to reduce barriers to international capital movements.
Any regulatory strategy must recognize the existence of the global mar-
ketplace, and the constraints this places on regulatory strategies. The futility of
unilateral regulatory efforts coupled with a progressive zeroing out of financial
regulation is a strong impetus to harmonize national regulations. 45 Though the
laws governing the securities markets of various countries are diverse in terms of
nature, purpose, and degree of protection, harmonization of securities laws is in
the common interest of nations. Recognition of the new problems confronting
regulators in a global market offers the U.S. an opportunity to continue exercis-
ing leadership in international finance. 46
41. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 59.
42. The dramatic swing in U.S. policy which has led to the repealing of withholding on Eu-
romarket instruments is evidence of such a bid-down. A central justification for ending the tax is that
the thereby forgone tax would be collected at the source of income by the foreign taxing entity.
However, since a prominent feature of the Euromarket is investor anonynimity it is arguable that the
tax is never collected at the source. If true, this evidence suggests national tax systems may be
becoming zeroed out by international business. U.S. efforts to restrict the use of bearer shares are
intended to recapture some regulatory control.
43. See Casey, Internationalization of Capital Markets, I SEC. REG. L.J. 252 (1973). In a rapidly
changing environment, a retreat by regulators to oversimplicity or overreaction leads to instability.
44. See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises,
94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981).
45. Historically, the United States has championed efforts to harmonize world tax systems. See
Abbin, Gordon & Renfroe, International Implications of a Cash Flow Consumption Tax, 28 TAX
NorEs 1127, 1129 (1985).
46. The important leadership role the United States plays in international policy includes initiating
concepts such as the foreign tax credit (subpart F), anti-avoidance legislation, and the legislation
designed to accomplish non-tax political goals such as anti-boycott rules and foreign corrupt practice
rules. The most recent example of U.S. leadership is with respect to the elimination of the 30%
withholding tax on portfolio interest. Though on balance the United States judgment has been sound,
it has been marked to an extent by a certain provincialism.
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C. Principles of Taxation and Banking
A system of securities regulation fundamentally requires the acceptance of
certain economic theories and political choices. Though many issues in interna-
tional securities regulation are newly emerging, certain of these issues bear
resemblence to issues in the fields of international taxation and international
banking-issues which have been addressed by the policies of capital neutrality
and coordinated supervision. Because the common denominator of securities,
tax, and banking regulation is that they direct international capital flows, the
experiences of international taxation and banking may provide useful insights to
the problems (and their resolutions) facing international securities regulation.
1. Capital Neutrality
The U.S. frequently has confronted the question of how its tax laws relate to
those of other nations. 47 Since the beginning of the corporate income tax in 190948
and the general income tax in 1913, 49 the U.S. expansively has applied its taxes to
world commerce. The U.S. has asserted tax jurisdiction over the worldwide
income of U.S. citizens, residents, and domestic corporations, regardless of the
source of that income. The U.S. has also taxed income of both U.S. and foreign
taxpayers on U.S. source income1° and certain foreign source income effectively
connected with the U.S.5'
If applied to the full extent, U.S. assertions of jurisdiction over non-U.S.
source income could impede international capital flows by imposing double
taxation. When the income producing activities of a U.S. citizen are conducted
abroad, U.S. jurisdiction overlaps with the jurisdiction of the source country, and
the income of the U.S. citizen can be taxed twice: once in the country in which it
is earned and once in the home country, the U.S.52 If neither jurisdiction yields,
double taxation ensues.
Unrestrained or unguided taxation reduces worldwide welfare by channeling
capital investments not in the direction of productivity but in avoidance of taxa-
tion. To maximize global welfare, the U.S. tax system employs a refined reg-
ulatory strategy based on the goal of capital-export neutrality and, to a lesser
47. The United States has exhibited both flexibility and rigidity in deciding to accommodate the
U.S. tax system to other systems. For example, in 1966, the United States agreed to a partial
abandonment of the "force of attraction" concept. On the other hand, certain United States ini-
tiatives, such as subpart F, and the repeal of withholding of portfolio interest have been embraced by
other nations. Policy decisions however, are inconclusive because of the continually changing en-
vironment. Ross, A Perspective on International Tax Policy, 26 TAX NomEs 701, 702 (1985).
48. Tariff of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909).
49. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, §§ II(A)(1), lI(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 116, 172 (1913).
50. Thus the differentiation of foreign source income from domestic source income is fundamental
to the United States system of taxation.
51. Passive income earned from United States sources by foreign taxpayers is often reduced or
eliminated by treaty.
52. In such circumstances, source-based jurisdiction is generally given primacy. Gann, The
Concept of an Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38 TAX L. REV. 1, 44 (1982).
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extent, capital-import neutrality. Capital-export neutrality requires that the deci-
sion of a prospective U.S. investor to operate in the U.S. or abroad not be
influenced by domestic tax law. Capital-import neutrality requires that foreign
businesses operating the U.S. be taxed in the same manner as similarly situated
U.S. businesses operating in the U.S. The concepts embody both equitable and
efficiency principles which may be useful in measuring securities laws reforms.
The two most widely followed policies used to eliminate double taxation are
the foreign-tax-credit method and the territorial method. Under the foreign-tax-
credit method, a country seeks capital-export neutrality by including the world-
wide income of its residents in its tax base, but allowing them credit for foreign
taxes paid against the tax it would otherwise impose on their foreign source
income. Under the territorial method a country seeks capital-import neutrality by
exempting the foreign source income of its residents from its own tax base, so
that enterprises operating in that host country are subject to the same total tax
whether their residence is local or foreign. 53 The former approach was chosen in
1918 by the U.S. 14
The U.S.'s securities laws are less integrated with other nations' laws than its
tax laws. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") has not
firmly resolved how its disclosure standards relate to those of other countries.
One reason is that the rapid globalization of international capital markets con-
founds traditional understanding of the institutional framework within which
international investments are made. 55 A second reason is that two conflicting
principles apply to the analysis of the problem of determining appropriate dis-
closure standards. One principle common to U.S. policy toward foreign invest-
ment is that of neutrality. A second principle is that the Commission's rulemaking
must advance the protection of investors and the public interest.56 The interre-
lation of these two principles is at the center of the debate.57
Seeking neutrality avoids laws that unduly advantage foreign issuers over
domestic issuers,58 and promotes efficiency of capital markets.5 9 One view of
53. A few highly industrialized countries (Belgium, France, and the Netherlands) exempt some
foreign source income from taxation. None of the world's highly industrialized countries exempts all
foreign source income from tax, so none has a pure territorial system.
54. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a), 40 Stat. 1057. See Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit:
Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REV. 227, 229 (1984).
55. Drucker, supra note 27, at 768 ("it may be a long time before economic theories accept that
there have been fundamental changes, and longer still before they adapt their theories to account for
them. ").
56. Securities Act §§ 7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§77g, 77j (1981). See also Integrated Disclosure System
for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6360, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,054 (Nov. 20, 1981) (also released as Release Nos. 34-18,274 and 39-677)
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 6360].
57. Spencer, The U.S. Sees Problems, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9 (May 1985).
58. SEC REPORT, supra note I, at 111-311.
59. It has also contributed to the dominance of the United States market. Koenig, supra note 16, at
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neutrality is that foreign enterprises issuing securities in the U.S. should be
subject of the same disclosure requirements as domestic issuers. This view of
neutrality complements the idea that U.S. investors need the same type of infor-
mation whether the issuer is domestic or foreign.
A second view of neutrality is the U.S. investors should have the same oppor-
tunities to invest overseas as investors of other countries. This view of neutrality
complements the idea that the investing public is best served by being permitted
to invest directly in a variety of securities. 6° To an extent, the two views of
neutrality and public interest are mutually inconsistent. The Commission has yet
to decide which should prevail. 6'
2. Coordinated Supervision
In the U.S., as in most countries, banks hold the largest portion of private
financial assets, and have important roles in the payments system and in the
implementation of monetary policy.62 The integrity and soundness of the U.S.
banking system, therefore, is of great national importance. 63 Because the world's
financial markets are highly interconnected, the failure of one financial institu-
tion can rapidly impair the viability of numerous unrelated institutions through-
out the world. 64 Thus the existence of an unregulated global market poses a direct
threat to the U.S. banking system.
The response of banking regulators has been an international regulatory strat-
egy which rests on two principles which derive from the common necessity of
nations to supervise financial institutions. One is that no institution should go
unsupervised. The other is that the supervision of institutions should be adequate.
From this international regulatory strategy, known as coordinated supervision, a
consensus is being reached on more specific issues. 65 The concept underlying
coordinated supervision may have applications to international securities
regulation.
The Commission is currently considering a regulatory response to interna-
60. Currently U.S. members may purchase foreign issues in foreign markets (that may offer less
protection to investors than those provided in U.S. markets). In the Commission's view, permitting a
number of foreign securities to be traded on U.S. regulated exchange markets may increase protection
for U.S. investors. See SEC REPORT supra note 1, at V-77, n.157. See also SEC Release No. 6360,
supra note 56; Spencer, supra note 57, at 9.
61. Spencer, supra note 57, at 9. Political forces also influence the choice of standards. Economic
nationalism is antithetical to internationalization. Koenig, supra note 16, at 72. Reciprocity is dis-
cussed in this context. Though it has been a longstanding policy of the United States to ignore the
national origins of financial firms in U.S. markets, (sometimes called "national treatment") economic
nationalism supplements this policy by imposing the precondition to U.S. national treatment access
by U.S. firms to foreign markets. Id. at 77-79.
62. TASK GROUP, supra note 5, at 35.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 34. See also Fingleton, Will the System Tumble?, EUROMONEY III (September 1986).
65. See Capital Maintenance; Revision to Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 5119 (1987)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. part 225) (proposed Feb. 12, 1987); Extension of Time to Comment, 52
Fed. Reg. 18,703 (1987).
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tionalization of the securities markets. Two approaches have been suggested:
common prospectus or reciprocal prospectus. Uniform standards have had a
difficult history in securities regulation; noteworthy are the failures of the Uni-
form Securities Code and blue-sky law harmonization. The consensus is that
reciprocal prospectus approach is best. Its implementation has begun. If the
experience of international banking is a guide, this cooperation among super-
visory authorities may lead to agreed upon disclosure standards.
II. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CAPITAL NEUTRALITY, THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAWS, AND TAX
POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
A. Principles of Capital Export and Import Neutrality.
Though the primary end of taxation is to raise revenue, the means of raising
revenue are traditionally measured against standards of equity and efficiency. 6
6
Some inefficiency is inherent in virtually all taxes, 67 so the efficiency criteria
require the tax system to produce as little as unintended distortion in the econ-
omy as possible. 68 In theory, global welfare is maximized when investors are free
to obtain the greatest possible return on their investments. An efficient tax sys-
tem, from a worldwide point of view, does not interfere with the employment of
capital where the before-tax return is the greatest. When a tax system does not
interfere with or direct in any manner capital investment, it is said to be capital
neutral.
66. The equity criteria requires that the revenue which is raised by the tax system be collected in a
manner which is as fair as possible. Both vertical and horizontal measurements must be considered.
Vertical equity involves the comparison of ability to pay for taxpayers with different amounts of
resources. Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal
amounts of tax and, correspondingly, in comparing any two taxpayers with different levels of ability
to pay, the taxpayer with the greater ability to pay should pay more tax than the other. CRS Publishes
overview of Foreign-Source Income Tax Issues, 20 TAX NOTES 475, 480 (1983). Another goal is
simplicity: making the tax system as simple to administer and understand as possible. In addition,
certain provisions of the tax system have been enacted to encourage specific activities which Congress
has felt should be promoted.
67. All forms of taxation are a departure from a perfectly efficient economic system for tax law
causes some taxpayers to alter their investment and financing decisions. These distortions in behavior
divert the flow of capital from the most productive investments, those investments offering the highest
pre-tax rate of return to those offering the highest post-tax return. This allocation of resources in a
free market economy, under certain conditions, ensures that available economic resources are arrayed
in such a way as to produce the highest possible amount of consumer satisfaction. Id. at 480. Thus the
benchmark of economic efficiency is the flow of capital which would occur in the absence of taxes.
As a benchmark for economic efficiency in the securities context, the flow of capital absent securities
regulation may serve as a valid bench mark. Such an environment exists in today's Euromarkets.
68. Virtually any tax which meets accepted equity criteria creates some interference with eco-
nomic incentives. In order to have no such effect, a tax would have to be determined on the basis of
some characteristic over which an individual has no control.
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Tax systems are examined for capital neutrality (hence efficiency) from two
points of view: neutrality in the export of capital and neutrality in the import of
capital. 69 Export of capital from a country occurs when an investor (a capital
supplier) from that country invests capital in another country. A tax system is
capital export neutral if it does not influence the investor's decision of whether to
invest in his home country or in another country. A tax system is capital-import
neutral if it does not influence the borrower's decision of whether to borrow from
a home country capital supplier or from a capital supplier from another country.
The principle of capital-export neutrality is applied as follows: if the foreign
operations of a U.S. enterprise are conducted in a country that imposes the same
effective tax rate as the U.S., the U.S., to achieve capital-export neutrality,
would impose no tax on that foreign source income. The U.S. enterprise is
therefore indifferent from a taxation standpoint whether the enterprise operates in
the U.S. or abroad, as its tax burden is the same in either country. Similarly, if
the foreign operations are in a country with a lower tax rate than the U.S., the
U.S. would impose a tax at a rate equal to the difference between its rate and the
source country's rate. If the foreign operations are in a country with a higher tax
rate, then credit is provided for foreign taxes paid in excess of the U.S. rate.70
The principle of capital-import neutrality is applied as follows: The U.S.
would impose no tax on foreign source income earned by any enterprise (U.S. or
otherwise) regardless of whether foreign countries impose the same effective tax
rate as the U.S., a higher tax rate, or a lower tax rate. By so doing, foreign
businesses operating in the U.S. are taxed in the same manner as similarly
situated U.S. businesses operating the U.S. For example, if the U.S. tax laws
were capital-import neutral, a foreign lender lending to a U.S. borrower is taxed
by the U.S. at the same rate as a U.S. lender lending to that same U.S. borrower.
Viewed from a different perspective, U.S. tax laws would not influence a pro-
spective U.S. borrower's decision of whether to borrow from a U.S. or a foreign
lender.
Capital-export and -import neutrality are unilateral measures (adopted by one
country without necessity for coordination with others) to improve economic
efficiency; however, the tax systems of other countries influence the success of
69. Ross, supra note 47, at 702. Though the concept of capital export neutrality is primarily a
theoretical concept, Ross believes that international U.S. tax policy generally reflects a balance
between theory and reality. Id. at 702-703.
70. Most highly industrialized countries, and most major trading partners of the United States
(including Canada, West Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom), tax worldwide income and allow
a foreign tax credit, generally like the U.S., to avoid international double taxation.
71. One effect of this arrangement is the possibility that the credit invites foreign countries to raise
their income taxes on United States firms to United States levels, as the additional tax would be bome
by the U.S. Treasury, not the corporation, which receives a credit. Conversely, the credit frustrates
incentives in the countries. lsenbergh, supra note 54, at 290-291. When the source jurisdiction tax
rate is lower than the United States, jurisdiction based on citizenship neutralizes attempts by foreign
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this policy.' For example, if one country's tax system is capital-export neutral,
and another country adopts a tax system that is capital-import favorable (it favors
foreign investment over domestic investment), that policy of the second country
would create an incentive in the first country to export capital to the second
country. In order to maximize global welfare, therefore, all the world's individual
tax systems must be both capital-export and -import neutral (with equal rates), or
must otherwise in concert produce what has been called "inter-nations" neu-
trality.72 Inter-nations neutrality exists when the combined effect of taxation in
the capital exporting country and taxation in the capital importing country do not
favor investment in one of the two countries or in a third country.
These principles may be applied to U.S. regulation of international securities
transactions, for economic efficiency is an implicit goal of our system of se-
curities regulation. Federal disclosure standards are predicated on full disclosure
rather, than on "fair, just, and equitable" standards, and are designed to promote
informed investment decisions. 73 Underlying many policy decisions of the Com-
mission is the recognition that the interests of the marketplace are best served by
efficiency and the elimination of unnecessary regulatory barriers. One of the
challenges of the Commission in internationalizing markets is to assure that U.S.
capital markets are afforded the protection intended by Congress in the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act while developing policies that are economically
sound. 74
countries to attract investment from the United States, because United States investments are taxed at
the same high United States rate. The benefits of another country lowering its rates goes to the United
States treasury, not to the United States companies. Thus our policy results to an extent in capital
import adverseness in the foreign country.
When the source jurisdiction tax rate is higher than the United States rate, the difficulty is caused
by the other jurisdiction. To maintain capital export neutrality, the United States must either subsidize
the United States corporation through the credit mechanism or persuade the foreign country to lower
its high taxes on income flowing to the United States in return for the United States lowering tax on
income of the foreign country's citizens. See generally Gann, The Cocept of an Independent Treaty
Foreign Tax Credit, 38 TAX L. REV. 1 (1982).
72. 69a CASHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL, 102 (1984). Rate differences alone may
nevertheless be components of a neutral system so long the cumulative effect of tax rates other factors
relating to taxation (such as the benefits derived from use of a country's facilities which resulted from
taxation) do not affect investment more favorably in one country.
73. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 89-90 (1933) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 875]; Hearings Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 12-13 (1933) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 4314]. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 37 (1959). See also Anderson, The Disclosure Process and Federal Securities Regulations:
A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1974); Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-46 (1983); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 764.
74. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-311 (SEC objectives include facilitating direct access to
United States capital markets by foreign issues and removing unnecessary impediments to transna-
tional capital formation.).
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B. Implementing Capital-Export Neutrality
U.S. securities regulations would adhere to the principle of capital-export
neutrality if the disclosure requirements of foreign issuers issuing securities in
the U.S. were equivalent to the the disclosure requirements of U.S. issuers. This
is distinct from requiring that the same specific items of disclosure be required
from foreign issuers as from U.S. issuers. What is required is that U.S. dis-
closure standards not influence a U.S. investor's decision of whether to invest in
securities of a U.S. issuer or in securities of a foreign issuer.
The disclosure requirements applicable to primary offerings of securities in the
U.S. largely satisfy the principle of capital-export neutrality. This occurrence is
not the result of an express adherence to the principle of capital-export neutrality;
rather, it is the product of a particular interpretation of the securities laws' man-
date of investor protection." That mandate is interpreted to require that U.S.
investors receive disclosure of certain information regardless of the nationality of
the issuer.76 As a result of this policy, disclosure requirements for foreign private
issuers77 are essentially the same as the requirements for domestic issuers,
thereby paralleling the principle of capital-export neutrality.78
The legislative history of the Securities Act evidences an intent to treat foreign
private issuers the same as domestic issuers.7 9 In implementing this directive,
however, the Commission has recognized the possibility that imposing equivalent
disclosure standards might discourage offerings of securities in the U.S. To allow
U.S. investors the opportunity to invest in foreign securities, as early as 1964, the
Commission reduced the degree of regulation and amount of disclosure required
75. Rules, Registration, and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchage Act Release
No. 16,371, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,363 (Nov. 29, 1979)
[hereinafter "SEC Release No. 16,371]. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-322.
76. SEC Release No. 16,371, supra note 75.
77. Disclosure requirements distinguish domestic issuers from North American issuers, foreign
government issuers, and foreign private issuers. The Commission's rules generally subject North
American issuers to registration and reporting requirements applicable to domestic issuers. The
primary exception is under §§ 12(a), 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(a), 77m(a) (1981)
under which North American issuers are treated similarly to foreign private issuers. Foreign govern-
ment is defined as the government of any foreign country or of any political subdivision of a foreign
country. 17 C.ER. § 230.405 (1986); 17 C.ER. § 240.3b-4(1986). For an excellent article on the
securities of foreign governments see Greene & Adee, The Securities of Foreign Governments,
Political Subdivisions, and Multinational Organizations, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 1
(1985). Foreign private issuers are companies other than those that: (A) are owned by a majority in
interest of U.S. residents; and (B) (i) are operated principally from the United States, (ii) have a
majority of their Board of Directors residing in the United States, or (iii) have more than fifty percent
of their assets in the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986). Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4
(1986), defines foreign private issuer as any foreign issuer other than a government.
78. SEC Release No. 6360, supra note 56 ("the Commission has perceived its function as neither
discriminating against nor encouraging foreign investment in the United States or investments in
foreign securities"). See Pozer, Disclosure and Trading in an International Securities Market, 15
INT'L LAW. 84 (1981).
79. Hearings on S. 875, supra notd 73; Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 73.
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of foreign issuers whose securities were traded in the U.S. s0 The more voluntary
steps the foreign issuer took to enter the U.S. capital markets, the more the
degree of regulation and amount of disclosure approached the degree of regula-
tion required of domestic registrants. 8' Because disclosure requirements were
differentiated, the system was not capital-export neutral.
Prior to 1964, certain "involuntary" foreign private issuers were not required
to file reports under the Exchange Act. In adopting the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1964, however, Congress enacted § 12(g)(1), which required companies
with over $1 million in assets and over 500 shareholders to report to the Commis-
sion.8 2 Concerned with maintaining the existing markets in foreign securities,
Congress also authorized the Commission to exempt a foreign issuer from § 12(g)
if such action would be in the public interest and consistent with investor protec-
tion. s3 Those issuers not exempted by the Commission were required to file
reports under Form 20 and Form 20-K, which required substantially less infor-
mation than that required of domestic issuers filling Form 10 and Form 10-K.84
The disparity in disclosure standards during this period arguably again varied
from capital-export neutrality.8 5
Beginning in 1976, the Commission began considering increasing the dis-
closure required under the Exchange Act for certain foreign private issuers.16 On
80. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rules 3a12-3 and 13a-ll and Proposed Rules 12g3-2,
13a-5, 15c1-10, 15d-16 and 17a-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
No. 7746, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,301 (Nov. 16, 1965).
81. SEC Release No. 6360, supra note 56.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g)(I) (1981).
83. Id. at § 781(g)(3). The Commission has exercised this exempting authority in Rule 12g3-2. 17
C.FR. § 2 4 0.12g3-2 (1981). The reporting obligation for other foreign private issuers may be sus-
pended. Reporting for securities not listed on an Exchange or traded on NASDAQ may be suspended
(except for a fiscal year in which a registration statement under the Securities Act becomes effective
or is required to be updated) if the class of securities is held by less than 300 United States residents or
less than 500 United States residents where the total assets of the issuer have not exceeded $5,000,000
on the last day of each of the issuer's three most recent fiscal years, 17 C.ER. § 240.12h-3. Periodic
reports must be filed with the Commission under the Exchange Act by any foreign private issuer with
securities listed on a national (i.e. United States) securities exchange or NASDAQ, and by issuers
that have made a registered public offering in the United States. Non-Canadian foreign private issuers
with securities quoted on NASDAQ prior to October, 1983 are exempt from this requirement. See
SEC Release No. 7746, supra note 86 (proposed rules); Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign
Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9
77,443 (Apr. 28, 1987) (final rules).
84. Adoption of Form 20-K and Repeal of Form 21-K, Exchange Act Release No. 8068,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,445 (April 28, 1967).
85. Whether the difference in disclosure standards indicates a variance from capital-export neu-
trality depends on attendant foreign corporate and accounting practices, which influence a foreign
issuers' decision of whether to issue securities in the United States. If there is a variance from capital-
export neutrality, whether that variance favors capital export or whether it is adverse to capital export
depends on the extent to which increased disclosure attracts investment, as information improves, and
on the extent to which increased disclosure discourages investment, as costs of capital increase.
86. Means of Improving Disclosure by Certain Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No.
13,056, [1976%o1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 80,830 (Dec. 16, 1976) (general
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November 29, 1979, the Commission adopted amendments to registration state-
ments, periodic reports, and annual reports required of certain foreign private
issuers.8 7 The amendments integrated the registration and annual report forms
into a single new form, Form 20-F, which replaced Form 20 and Form 20-K.
Form 20-F substantially increased the disclosure requirements of foreign private
issuers, placing them on a level closer to that required of domestic registrants.
Recognizing the difference in national laws and accounting practices that
govern foreign private issuers, the Commission reduced or modified disclosure
requirements in financial reporting,88 industry segment reporting,8 9 time of filing
requirements, and management remuneration. 90 Form 20-F continues to be the
primary form used by Exchange Act registrants. 9' Though Form 20-F generally
calls for a narrative disclosure less extensive than that required by Forms 1092 and
concept of substantially equivalent disclosure). Proposed Rules, Forms and Guidelines on Foreign
Issuer Disclosure, Exchange Release No. 14,128, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,361 (Nov. 2, 1977) (specific proposals).
87. SEC Release No. 16,371, supra note 75.
88. Financial statements must supply information similar to that required of domestic companies,
though they need not be prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting
principles or Regulation S-X, the financial statement regulations, if they are presented in accordance
with accounting principles generally accepted in the domicile country and a reconciliation of the
difference in measurement items (the income statement and balance sheet amounts) is provided. A
reconciliation of significant variations from United States GAAP and Regulation S-X is required. The
reconciliation need only be of the differences in the measurement items (income statement and
balance sheet amounts) in the annual reports of foreign private issuers. The same limited reconcilia-
tion may be used for offerings of certain non-convertible investment grade debt, securities issued
upon exercise of certain rights, or warrants, pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan, or upon
conversion of outstanding securities. Full reconciliation of financial statements to United States
GAAP and Regulation S-X is required for other offerings. See SEC Release No. 16,371, supra note
75. Financial statements are a difficult area for foreigners. See, e.g., Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone &
Sons, Inc., 362 E Supp. 939, 948-50 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, 488 E2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
89. Except for certain offerings of securities where a full reconciliation to United States GAAP is
required, only revenue information must be broken into categories of activity and geographic markets
("segments"), unless the total operating profit from each segment materially differs from their
respective contributions to total sales and revenue, in which case narrative disclosure is required. See
SEC Release No. 16,371, supra note 75.
90. Compensation of directors and officers need be disclosed only in the aggregate unless the
issuer discloses such information to its shareholders or otherwise makes this information public. See
id.. Information regarding transactions with management is required, but need be presented only to
the extent the registrant discloses such information to its shareholders or otherwise makes public the
information. See id.
91. Foreign private issuers entitled to file annual reports on Form 20-F are not required to file the
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. 17 C.ER. § 249.308a (1987), or current reports on Form 8-K, 17
C.ER. § 249.308 (1987), as domestic issuers. Rather, such foreign issuers furnish Form 6-K reports
which require disclosure of information and material to investors made public pursuant to foreign law,
stock exchange regulations, or distributed to security holders. Form 6-K requires english translations,
versions, or summaries only of information distributed to security holders and of material press
releases.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1987).
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10-K, 93 the disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act closely approach
capital-export neutrality.
On November 20, 1981, as part of an effort to develop an integrated disclosure
system, the Commission proposed the adoption of a new "F-series" of forms for
foreign private issuers required to file Form 20-F 94 As adopted on December 6,
1982, 95 the registration statements available for foreign private issuers making
distributions in U.S. markets are Forms F-l, F-2, F-3, F-496, and F-6. 97 Form F-1
93. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1987).
94. SEC Release No. 6360, supra note 56.
95. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6437, [6
Listing Tables Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,407 (Dec. 2, 1982).
96. Form F-4 is available for business combinations. Though beyond the scope of this paper, as the
securities markets become internationalized, those seeking to acquire control of corporations with
shareholders residing in a number of countries, must comply with the regulations governing tender
offers of each country and political subdivisions which assert jurisdiction. The problems of a prospec-
tive tender offeror are compounded if the offer is an exchange offer, for the bidder must comply with
the registration and distribution requirements in each country where the securities are offered. The
United States substantive and disclosure provisions make some provisions for foreign bidders, but on
the whole imposes requirements equal to those of domestic bidders.
For comparative analyses of tender offer regulations see SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at Chapter III.
See generally INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES: LAW AND PRACTICE (. Robinson ed. 1985).
Tender offers for the securities of companies reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are regulated by the commission under the Williams Act provisions of the Act. See § 13(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1981) (reporting requirements for substantial acquisitions of equity securities); § 14(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1981) (information filing and dissemination); § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1981)
(antifraud). The regulations thereunder do not provide for special treatment of foreign bidders. See 17
C.FR. § 240.3a12-3 (registered securities of foreign private issuers exempt from reporting and proxy
rules of Exchange Act but not Williams Act). Additionally, exchange offers are subject to registration
under the Securities Act of 1933. A number of states have also passed takeover statutes and, more
recently control share statutes. Disclosure of material financial information is difficult. Disclosure of
foreign law may be problematic, see, e.g., Gen. Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 FSupp. 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), as may disclosing information about each person controlling the offeror. See
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973) (special problems).
The United States antitrust laws, which apply to foreign companies if they do business in the
United States or if their activities have an effect on United States commerce, can also pose restrictions
to foreign bidders. See 16 C.F.R. § 802.51 (1986) (exemptions for acquisition by certain foreign
companies of certain United States and foreign companies from waiting periods of Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976). Other investments in certain industries are restricted. See
.- Fleischer & Feder, Special Problems of Foreign Bidders in Acquisitions by Tender Offer, I J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 349, 353 (1978). For the most part, however, the United States historically has
encouraged foreign investment in this country. See Berger, Applying Uniform Margin Requirements
to Foreign Entities Attempting to Acquire U.S. Corporations, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 543 (1984).
97. Form F-6 is used for registration of American depositary shares evidenced by American
Depositary Receipts. American depositary shares are shares issued by foreign issuers for sale in
American markets. For an excellent article on American Depositary Receipts see Royston, The
Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Americanization of the International Capital Markets,
10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 87 (1985). Such shares represent beneficial ownership in the
foreign securities and are issued to avoid problems inherent in the ownership of foreign securities,
such as collection of dividends and transfer problems. Because the American depositary share is a
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is used for initial public offerings. Forms F-2 and F-3 are available for foreign
issuers that have previously registered securities under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act. Forms F-2 and F-3 permit incorporation by reference of reports
filed under the Exchange Act, but Form F-2 requires delivery of those reports
with the prospectus. Form F-3 is available only for issuers who have been
reporting under the Exchange Act for at least 36 months and who are "world-
class" issuers9" or are offering investment grade securities, securities issued upon
exercise of certain rights or warrants, securities issued pursuant to a dividend
reinvestment plan or upon conversion of outstanding securities or securities
issued in a secondary offering.
The flexibility with which the Commission has confronted the problems of
foreign private issuers, without compromising investor protection or capitulating
to the pressures to encourage offerings in the U.S. by foreign issuers, has
resulted in a disclosure system which today approximates capital-export neu-
trality. Moreover, though the Commission has made some modifications in dis-
closure requirements to recognize home country laws and practices, the liabilities
for such disclosure provided by the Securities Act and Exchange Act apply
equally to foreign and domestic issuers. 99 The neutral overlay of the liability
security separate from the underlying shares of the foreign issuer, it must be registered for sale in the
United States.
98. A world class issuer is one who has an equity float of no less than $500 million, at least $150
million of which is held by U.S. residences, or that is registering investment grade debt securities.
SEC Release No. 6360, supra note 56.
99. Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k (1981), provides that any person (without
regard to nationality) who acquired a registered security may bring suit if any part of the registration
statement (when that part became effective) contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading.
Section 12 of the Securtities Act imposes liability upon any person who offers or sells a security in
violation of § 5, or who offers or sells a security by the use of the jurisdictional means by means of a
prospectus or oral communication which includes misleading statements or omissions of material
information.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by use of the jurisdictional means directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud; (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement or commission;
or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would separate as
a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 make it unlawful to engage
in this conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rules governing secondary market trading activity during an offering also are implicated by the
internationalization of the securities market. Rule lOb-6 proscribes certain conduct by persons who
are participating in a distribution. 17 C.ER. § 240. 10b-6 (1986). Rule 10b-7 governs stabilization of
the price of a security to facilitate an offering. Because foreign methods of distribution differ
substantially from those of the Untied States, certain foreign distribution activities directly violate
Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at V-17. The Commission in appropriate cases
provides relief from these rules in order to reflect the realities of international offerings. For example,
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sections upon the disclosure requirement produce a substantially capital-export-
neutral system.
In summary, the Commission views the needs of investors in the U.S. markets
to be largely the same whether the issuer is domestic or foreign.'°' Thus, the
disclosure requirements for foreign and domestic issuers selling the same type of
securities to the same class of investors are roughly comparable.' 0' Also, liability
provisions apply with equal force to foreign and domestic issuers. Thus, the
Commission's approach to internationalized securities markets largely comports
with the principle of capital-export neutrality.
Nevertheless, currently foreign issuers are dissuaded'0 by U.S. initial and
periodic disclosure requirements'03 and liability exposure, t°4 and the Commission
is considering measures to facilitate foreign offerings in the U.S. 0 The Commis-
sion is developing a proposal for the registration of specified securities based on
the reciprocal approach. 06 The reciprocal registration statement forms would use
the offering document required in an issuer's home country as the prospectus for
offerings in the U.S. The offeror must comply with any state law requirements
that may be applicable. 07 Limited rights offers and exchange offers may be
permitted on these forms, to encourage the inclusion of U.S. investors in such
offers by facilitating the registration process. The keys to implementation of the
approach are appropriate accounting principles and auditing standards. If a re-
ciprocal approach is used, these areas are central in determining which jurisdic-
the Commission recently issued two exemptive orders in global offerings to permit stabilizing bids to
be placed in markets abroad and in U.S. markets based on the principal market for such securities
where the principal market was not in the U.S. See Commission Delegates Exemptive Authoruty for
Rule lOb-7 to Staff, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 784. Securities letters have provided
that, under certain terms and conditions, stabilizing bids may be adjusted to reflect changes in
currency relationships. See. e.g., Relief Granted in International Offering of Spanish Bank Securities,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1068 (July 17, 1980).
100. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-322.
101. ld..
102. The Commission recognizes the reluctance of foreign issuers to enter U.S. markets. Id. at
111-323.
103. Particularly in accounting principles and auditing standards. Foreign issuers must also con-
sider the continuing reporting costs under the Exchange Act.
104. Many issuers are dissuaded by the litigious environment of the Untied States and submission
to SEC oversight. The Commission hopes that these concerns will lessen as home country markets
mature, home country regulatory bodies become more active and mutual surveillance and enforce-
ment agreements are developed and used. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-323.
105. Recently, the Commission has taken steps to facilitate U.S. offerings of securities by foreign
banks. Id. at VI-24.
106. Id. at 111-324.
107. One important obstacle to overcome in facilitating foreign issuers' access to the United States
capital markets is the myriad of blue sky laws. The Commission staff and representatives of state
securities regulators have begun to discuss ways to coordinate the requirements applicable to foreign
issuers entering the United States capital markets. See id. at 111-327.
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tions should be included' °8 and what classes of issuers and types of securities
should be permitted. °9
Other rulemaking efforts, not directly targeted at international issues, also may
facilitate foreign issuers' access to the market." 0 Small-issuer exemptions under
§ 3(b) of the Securities Act, in addition to helping small issuers in the U.S., may
provide assistance to foreign issuers with U.S. employees or security holders. " '
Similarly, the Commission is considering exempting under § 3(b) of the Se-
curities Act rights offerings and possible exchange offerings of less than $5
million made by non-reporting companies. Acting to clarify when institutions
may resell unregistered securities to other institutions may reduce the cost of
private placements."12 This may encourage foreign issuers to access the U.S.
through the private placement mechanism.
Care needs to be taken as an integral part of this effort to avoid accommoda-
tions to foreign corporate practices," 3 particularly where such accommodations
represent variances from capital-export neutrality. The disclosure standards must
be more closely tailored to the particular circumstances of foreign issuers" 4 in
order to remain capital-export neutral.
C. Implementing Capital-Import Neutrality
In contrast to capital-export neutrality, U.S. securities regulations would be
capital-import neutral if the disclosure requirements of U.S. issuers issuing se-
curities to U.S. investors were equivalent to the disclosure requirements of U.S.
issuers issuing securities to foreign investors. The criteria that must be adhered to
by the Commission in implementing capital import neutral policies is that U.S.
disclosure standards not influence a U.S. issuer's decision of whether to issue
securities to U.S. investors or to foreign investors.
U.S. disclosure requirements largely satisfy these criterion, and therefore are
108. The commission proposed initially to implement the reciprocal approach with the United
Kingdom and Canada, because the disclosure and accounting practices of those countries are most
similar to those of the United States, and because of familiarity with those countries, standards due to
the frequency or their issuers' filings in the United States.
109. Initially, it will extend to world class issuers of investment grade debt, because those se-
curities would trade, in large part, on yield and rating. Thus, reconciliation of accounting and
auditing from the home country presentation would not be essential.
110. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-326.
111. See Reporting by Small Issuers, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,360 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F R. parts
230, 240, 249 and 260).
112. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-327. See Relief Granted in International Offering of Spanish
Bank Securities, supra note 99, at 1068 (important no-action letter for foreign issuers accessing U.S.
markets).
113. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-311.
114. See McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 45 (arguing repeal of registration to facilitate offerings in
the U.S. by foreign issuers).
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capital-import neutral. § 5(a) of the Securities Act of 19331' s requires registra-
tion, unless exempt, of securities offered or sold by use of the jurisdictional
means." 6 § 2(7) includes within the scope of the Securities Act "trade or com-
merce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto...
between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia."'" 7 Because the registration requirements apply to transactions within the
jurisdictional ambit, without regard to the nationality of the issuer, they are
capital-import neutral.
The U.S. has not chosen to assert the registration provisions of § 5 of the
Securities Act extraterritorially to full extent of Act's jurisdictional reach. In-
stead, the Commission traditionally has taken the position that the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act are primarily intended to protect U.S.
investors,"' thus the Commission has limited the application of the registration
provisions of § 5 to circumstances involving U.S. persons or markets." 9 In
Securities Act Release No. 4708, the Commission indicated that registration is
not required if securities are "distributed abroad to foreign nationals even though
use of jurisdictional means may be involved in the offering ...[provided] the
distribution is to be effected in a manner which will result in the securities
coming to rest abroad." 20
Though the release does not describe offering procedures the Commission
considers reasonably designed to prevent distribution in the U.S., an array of no-
action letters have expanded on the requirements.' 2 Additionally, in certain
circumstances, sales to non-U.S. persons made within U.S. markets have been
considered beyond the scope of the registration provisions.12 2 However, the de-
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982).
116. Any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1981).
118. SEC Release No. 4708, supra note 14.
119. Statement of the commission concerning applicability of the Securities Act of 1933 to offer-
ings of securities outside the U.S. and concerning applicability of § 15(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to foreign underwriters as part of a program of the Presidential Task Force to reduce U.S.
balance of payments deficit and protect U.S. gold reserves. Id. In that release, the Commission took
the position that it would not take enforcement action if securities are sold under circumstances
reasonably designed to prevent the distribution or redistribution of the securities into the United States
or to United States person. Id. When such circumstances are not met, the SEC will take enforcement
action. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. North American Research and Develop-
ment Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consolidated Mining Co., 167 F.
Supp. at 248. See also 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2407-08 (1969).
120. Securities Act Release No. 4708, supra note 14, at $ 1362. The theory underlying this release
is being reexamined in light of the changing global securities markets.
121. See generally Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. LAW. 69,
70-79 (1984).
122. See, e.g., Israel Discount Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, (July 23 and Sept. 13, 1981) (avail-
able in SEC public files); Bank Leumi le-lsrael, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 77,233 (May 7, 1982).
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marcation of the appropriate reach of § 5 has not been definitively determined.
Nevertheless, for those offerings within the scope of § 5, the disclosure standards
apply equally to offerings made to domestic and to foreign issuers, and are
therefore capital-import neutral.
So long as the jurisdictional means are used, the antifraud provisions of the
Williams Act apply whether or not an offering is exempt from registration.' 23
Courts have evolved two tests to determine the extraterritorial application of the
Williams Act: the conduct test and the effects test. 4 The conduct test focuses on
the extent and substantiality of conduct occurring in the U.S. The effects test
extends jurisdiction to acts performed abroad causing substantial and foreseeable
harm to interests within the U.S. The effects test rests on the theory that Con-
gress intended to protect U.S. investors from foreign transactions that artificially
influence prices and trading volume, erode public confidence, and have other
adverse effects on U.S. markets. Both tests may be viewed as merely expansive
interpretations of jurisdiction based on territoriality, and therefore do not alter the
capital-import neutrality of the antifraud provisions.
Several recent interpretive and no-action letters address issues raised by the
transnational trading of securities and may refine the neutrality of the laws. 25
These developments take positions which allay fears of foreign issuers and pre-
vent U.S. investors from being excluded from foreign offerings, including rights
offerings, privatization offerings, and exchange offers. 26 These securities could
be acquired by U.S. institutions and resold onto foreign national exchanges in the
ordinary course of exchange transactions without inquiry as to the citizenship or
residence of the purchaser. The rationale advanced by the Commission is that
because of the limited U.S. investor participation on those exchanges such a
resale would not be directed at U.S. persons. These measures would refine the
capital-import neutrality of U.S. securities laws.
For U.S. issuers raising capital abroad, avoiding extraterritorial application of
§ 5 of the Securities Act requires complex and costly offering procedures de-
123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q, 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1984).
124. See generally Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 E2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone. Inc.,
519 E2d 974 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); lIT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfield,
619 F2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980); Plessy Co. PLC v. Gen. Elec. Co. PLC, 628 FSupp. 477 (D. Del.
1986).
125. SEC REPORT, supra note i, at 111-321. See, e.g., College Retirement Equities Fund
("CREF"), SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420 (Feb.
18, 1987). See also Bank Agency Gets SEC Staff Go-Ahead for Unregistered Foreign Offering, 46
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 1131 (June 30, 1986).
126. College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [Current (1987-88) Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,503 (June 4, 1987). See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-321. French
Privatization Program, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,439 (Apr. 17, 1987).
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signed to assure that registration provisions do not apply. 127 By design, U.S.
persons are excluded from many offshore investment opportunities or must wait
for a period after the offering. 128 Despite the capital-import neutrality of the laws,
issuers, both domestic and foreign, have been dissatisfied with the complex
procedures required to assure that securities sold abroad are not sold or resold to
U.S. persons.
The determination of the appropriate reach of § 5 is complicated by the exemp-
tion for secondary trading. 29 Foreign issues of both foreign and domestic issuers
potentially subject to § 5 at the time of issuance may be traded a few months later
in U.S. secondary markets without U.S. securities laws implications. This is
because, pursuant to the Securities Act, registration is generally required for
offers or sales of new offerings of securities by issuers or affiliates, while second-
ary trades are exempt from registration under the Securities Act. Moreover, the
periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act do not extend to foreign
securities traded only in foreign markets. 30 U.S. investors have made purchases
in offshore trading markets in great volume, resulting in many occurrences of this
differing treatment of U.S. persons in primary and secondary markets.'
U.S. persons who have purchased securities of foreign issuers in the foreign
secondary markets face difficulties in participating in or are excluded from rights
or exchange offers. Foreign issuers may be reluctant to register the offerings in
the U.S. Rather than register the securities, the foreign issuer will either exclude
U.S. holders or provide them with cash in lieu of securities. U.S. investors have
become discontent with their exclusion from investment opportunities caused by
application of the securities registration requirements to foreign issues.'32
A consensus is emerging that § 5 should be limited more territorially, as where
the U.S. capital markets are more directly involved.' A territorial approach to
127. See Belier & Berney, Eurobonds, 19 REV. OF SEC. AND COMM. REG. 39 (1986); See also
Globalization of Financial Markets Report, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 88 (Feb. 1987).
128. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-311.
129. See Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll).
130. Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act §§ 12(b), (g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (g) (1982), issuers
with securities registered on a national securities exchange, or engaged in interstate commerce, in a
business affecting interstate commerce or with securities traded by use of any instrumentality of
interstate commerce and with more than 500 shareholders of record and $5 million in assets, must
register those securities under the Exchange Act. Foreign issuers with fewer that 300 United States
security holders are exempt from the provisions of § 12 (g). In addition, foreign issuers whose
securities are not traded on an exchange or quoted on NASDAQ may claim an exemption from § 12(g)
pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 CF.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1987), if they file with the SEC the documents
they are required to make public in their home jurisdiction. Certain issuers whose securities were
quoted on NASDAQ prior to October 5, 1983, may also rely on the exemption.
131. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-314-316.
132. Id. at 111-316.
133. For example, in February 1987, the Commission held a roundtable with representatives of the
bar, issuers, investors and securities professionals to discuss internationalization of the securities
markets. The participants favored the territorial approach.
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the regulatory provisions of the Securities Act is consistent with the regulatory
ambit of the Exchange Act and with comity principles.' 34 A territorial approach
gives primacy to the laws in which a market is located. As investors choose their
markets they would choose the laws applicable to such markets. A territorial
approach to registration would be complemented by extraterritorial application of
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
A territorial approach would reach to all participants in the U.S. capital mar-
kets, including foreign persons in the U.S. The disparate treatment of U.S.
investors when they purchase in primary offerings and when they purchase in
foreign secondary markets would be reduced as the primary consideration in
applying U.S. disclosure regulations to sales in the primary and secondary mar-
kets would be whether the offer or sale is made within the U.S. To prevent
circumvention, offshore offerings targeted at U.S. investors or intended to evade
U.S. securities laws would be fully regulated. A territorial approach would
therefore place great weight on the concept of an "offer or sale within the
U.S. "135
Both domestic and foreign issuers that offer securities abroad and have active
U.S. trading would be subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act so that U.S. investors who buy securities offered abroad that flow
back to the U.S. are provided the same information that would be provided by the
registration process. The integrated disclosure system for domestic, as well as
foreign, companies that file Exchange Act reports already permits certain com-
panies to incorporate by reference Exchange Act reports into Securities Act
filings. 136 The territorial approach would place even greater reliance on the peri-
odic reporting system mandated by the Exchange Act. Whether a more restrictive
134. As a matter of comity, it is questionable whether United States laws should require foreign
issuers making primary offerings in foreign markets in accordance with the laws of that foreign
jurisdiction to take extensive precautions to assure the securities are not sold to United States persons,
as often happens.
135. One of the important lessons from banking and taxation is that the national interest is best
served when barriers and impediments to capital formation are removed. Moreover, the process of
lowering those barriers must be gradual, and statements of national interests not relinquished or
retracted.
The United States' success with the foreign tax credit method, whereby national interest is defined
expansively and accomodations made to stronger competing claims, suggests that a narrowly defined
territorial system should serve only as a transition until international disclosure levels are more
harmonized. A territorial concept with disclosure levels higher than other systems, no matter how
narrowly defined, invites circumvention, impairs the competitiveness of markets within the territory,
and departs from inter-nations neutrality principles. A reciprocal approach coupled with harmonized
laws is the equivalent of the foreign tax credit and supports broader assertion of jurisdiction require-
ment principles of coordinated supervision fill in details.
136. See Forms S-2, S-3, F-2, and F-3. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12, .13, .32, .33 (1987).
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territorial system is preferable is questionable, but it does satisfy the principle of
capital-import neutrality. 
3 7
D. Implementing Inter-Nations Neutrality
Though the U.S. systems of securities regulation when analyzed in isolation
closely approaches capital-export and -import neutrality, when analyzed in con-
cert with the securities laws of other countries, the U.S. system, largely because
its disclosure standards are higher than those of other countries, favors the import
of capital and is neutral to the export of capital. Because as with international
taxation, lower disclosure standards abroad influence the direction of investments
though domestic policies may be capital-neutral, the Commission should strive
for inter-nations neutrality, whereby the combined effect of disclosure standards
in the U.S. and disclosure standards in other countries do not favor investment in
any one country.
The traditional method in taxation to resolve problems created by other coun-
tries is the use of international tax treaties,' 38 which seek inter-nations neu-
trality,39 but this vehicle has not been used in international securities. As detailed
in the next section, harmonization of securities laws also has had little success.
The U.S. also faces difficulty in achieving inter-nations neutrality because of the
presence of the Euromarkets, the U.S.'s position as a debtor, and the need to
foster competitiveness of U.S. capital markets, which present the danger that
U.S. standards are reduced to lower standards than in the national interest.
Retraction to a territorial approach for example, is explicable as necessitated by
U.S. economic conditions, because the access to the Euromarkets by U.S. issu-
ers is made more certain, while no similar concessions are made to U.S. inves-
tors. The strategy to avoid unwise concessions is to negotiate with other countries
to reach a consensus. The process for reaching a consensus on disclosure stan-
dards may be derived from the experience of international banking in coordinated
supervision.
137. McLaughlin, supra note 34 (territorial system "is certainly not likely to work where the only
interest being served is preservation of the non-applicability of 1933 Act registration requirements that
no longer withstand scrutiny under any reasonable cost-benefit analysis.").
138. Tax treaties may be a way to accomplish a goal which Congress is unwilling to accomplish by
legislation. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLuM. L.
REV. 815, 856 (1956). Treaty approaches can exert as significant pressures on foreign fiscal systems as
the foreign tax credit. For example if one country offers tax concessions to attract foreign investment,
and other countries did the same or were left out, the attractiveness of such concessions would
disappear to that one country. Only the investor benefits. Id. at 857. This is one reason why treaties
with developing countries are difficult.
139. An Interview with Outgoing Counsel Stephen E. Shay: Part Two, 36 TAX NoTEs 843, 844
(1987).
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III. INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: COORDINATED SUPERVISION, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND
FOREIGN LAWS
A. The Principle and Process of Coordinated Supervision
As with securities markets, internationalization of banking inevitably affects
the U.S. financial system.' 4° Transnational lending has an extensive history, 141
marked recently by cooperation in international banking as a result of strains on
the international system. The two primary goals of financial regulation are sta-
bility of the financial system and the efficient delivery of financial services. 142
Stability is pursued by imposing upon financial institutions liquidity require-
ments, 43 deposit guarantees, lending limits, limits on loans to single bor-
rowers, '44 capital adequacy ratios,145 and bad debt reserves. 46 Foreign-exchange
140. See, e.g., Breeden, Reforming Regulation in Financial Services in the U.S., 20 IrNrr'L LAW.
775, 776 (1986).
141. See, Mendelsohn, The Long Historical Lure of Banking in Britain, AM. BANKER, July 30,
1986, at 28.
142. In the United States, the goals of stability and efficiency are pursued by various agencies.
Generally, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises national banks, the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) supervises state chartered member banks of the Federal Reserve System
and bank holding companies, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulates insured
non-member banks, and state agencies regulate state chartered banks. Because banks may choose
either state or federal charters, the system has been referred to as the "dual banking" system. See
Scott, The Dual Banking System, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977). Overlapping jurisdiction also has lead to
distinctive regulatory philosophies among the agencies. See Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision
of International Lending: Part I, 19 INT'L LAW. 1059, 1069 (1985).
Foreign controlled banks located in the U.S. are subject to substantially the same requirements as
other U.S. banks. For analyses of supervision of foreign offices of U.S. banks, see COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE U.S., DESPITE POSITIVE BENEFITS, FURTHER FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S.
BANKS SHOULD BE LIMITED UNTIL POLICY CONFLICTS ARE FULLY ADDRESSED, (1980), at 7-1 to
8-24; and Schockey and Glidden, Foreign-Controlled U.S. Banks: The Legal and Regulatory En-
vironment, in COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, STAFF PAPERS (1980). U.S. banks are given legal
authority to operate abroad. Federal Reserve Act §§ 25, 25(a), Bank Holding Company Act §
4(c)(13). Overseas branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks generally must be authorized by the host
country. For description of the role of U.S. monetary authorities in the supervision of foreign offices,
see Final Rule Revision: International Banking Operations, 44 Fed. Reg. 36005-012 (1979); and
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra. Consumer protection is another of the principal
purposes of government financial regulation. In liberalized markets governments nevertheless regu-
late disclosure of the specific terms and prices of financial products and services. Contract enforce-
ment and fraud prevention are also traditional objects of government regulations.
143. Not through ratios but as part of examinations. Friesen, supra note 142, at 1078.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (1985). Rojc, National Bank Lending Limits, 40 Bus. LAW. 903 (1985).
145. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1988). Glidden, Capital-Based Limits on International Banking, 11 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 465 (1986).
146. The object of bad debt reserves is to contain the failure of a single institution and prevent it
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trading is not regulated in the U.S. although exchange transactions are reviewed
by examiners as part of the routine supervisory process.1 47 Bank portfolios are
also examined for country specific risk factors. 
148
U.S. banking regulators early had to confront the decision of the relation
between U.S. banking law and that of other nations. A reality of internationaliza-
tion is that no major banking system can isolate itself completely from worldwide
developments. Pressures to dismantle rigid financial systems, in the world de-
rived from uncertainty brought on by many factors, including the move to a
managed float exchange rate system in the early 1970s, worldwide inflation and
high interest rates, and balance of payments problems of a large number of oil
importing, developing debtor countries. 1
49
The cost of deregulation and internationalization, however, is that the risks of
systemic reactions to specific problems are increased. 50 A paradox is that the
more efficient market mechanism is for transmitting information, the greater the
potential for the market to overreact, or to react irrationally.'"' Deregulation has
demanded effective bank supervision in order to make the competitive environ-
ment safe from systemic risk. The threat to bank safety and soundness from
weakly regulated overseas banks, as well as the actual failure of several banks
operating in the international marketplace in the early 1970s prompted bank
supervisory authorities to improve the coordination among themselves.
The International Lending Supervision Act'52 directs the Federal Banking
from spreading into a more generalized crisis or collapse of public confidence in the overall financial
system.
147. Revey, Evaluation and Growth of the United States Foreign Exchange Market, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N. Y. Q. REV., Aut. 1981, at 32, 34-5.
148. A supervisory system adopted by the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and under the direction of the Interagency Country
Exposure Review Committee (ICERC) went into effect in 1979. It applies to all U.S. banks involved
in international lending operations. ICERC analyzes political, social, and economic forces which
influence a country's ability to service external obligations. Bench & Sable, International Lending
Supervision, II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 427, 435 (1986). A major concern in the analysis of
country risk and exposure is whether bank portfolios are sufficiently diversified across countries. In
instances where exposure surveys and examination of individual banks reveal an inappropriate degree
of exposure, an effort is made to encourage country lending practices that are more prudent. It is
significant that the focus of U.S. authorities has been primarily on additional information and on
supervision rather than on additional regulation. The establishment of rigid lending limits to foreign
countries has been considered inappropriate. See Proposed Solutions to International Debt Problems:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 502 and S. 695,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-51 (1983) (statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Federal Reserve
System).
149. Hultman, U.S. International Bank Supervision & the Revised Basle Concordat, MAG. BANK
AD., Feb. 1985, at 76.
150. Gardener, A British View of Bank Capital Adequacy in Europe, IssuEs IN BANK REG., Spring
1986, at 23.
151. Id.
152. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 § 901, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. 1988).
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Agencies to coordinate international lending supervision.'53 The U.S. is a mem-
ber of the Basel Committee, the Institute for International Finance, and other
supervisory groups. 154 Since its inception in 1975, the Basel Committee has been
the pre-eminent body in international financial cooperation. The Basel Commit-
tee is an advisory body of bank supervisors and central bankers representing
Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S. The first Basel Concordat was established in 1975 following the Herstatt
Bank and Franklin National Bank failures in 1974.111
In 1975 the Basel Committee of Supervisors set out principles for the supervi-
sion of banks where those banks operated in more than one national jurisdic-
tion. 56 In June 1983 the Committee published "Principles for the Supervision of
Banks' Foreign Establishments" which restates 57 the principles of the original
1975 document but also incorporates the principle of consolidated supervision.'58
These two documents, known as the Concordats, are grounded upon two funda-
mental principles: first, that no foreign banking establishment should escape
supervision; and second, that the supervision should be adequate. Thus the
Concordats assign supervisory responsibility among the parent authority and the
host authority. The Concordats also outline procedures to be followed to insure
that each authority is properly supervising a banking establishment.
The Concordats assign and divide responsibility for supervising the liquidity
and solvency of banking establishments between parent and host authority. Su-
pervisory responsibility is assigned according to whether the banking establish-
ment is a branch, a subsidiary, or a joint venture and according to the nature of
the problem-liquidity or solvency-that must be supervised. Assigning super-
visory authority in this manner may be called "coordinated supervision".
Assigning supervisory responsibility does not preclude gaps and inadequacies
in supervision of banks' foreign establishments. For example, some host au-
153. Id. §§ 3901(a)(2), 3901(b).
154. The U.S. is a member of the Bank of International Settlements and the Institute of Intema-
tional Finance only through the membership of private U.S. banks in those institutions. See Hackney,
The Regulation of International Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, II N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COMM. REG. 475 (1986).
155. Hultman, supra note 149, at 77.
156. Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, The New Concordat -
Principles for the Supervision of Banks Foreign Establishments, ISSUES IN BANK REG., Summ. 1984
at 25.
157. The Restatement explicitly notes that it does not consider the question of lenders of last resort.
This is an indication of what is not more properly addressed in this framework.
158. The text of the revised Basle Concordat is contained in Revised Basle Concordat on Bank
Oversight Clarifies the Division of Supervisory Roles, 12 IMF SURv. 201, 202-3 (1983). The Basle
Concordats do not bind the representative agencies, but rather serve as guidelines. A discussion of the
Basle Committee (also known as the Cooke Committee) and the 1975 Concordat is provided in G.G.
Johnson and Richard K. Abrams, Aspects of the International Banking Safety Net, WASHINGTON:
INTERNArIONAL MONETARY FUND (March 1983) at 24-30.
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thorities do not have the skills or resources to fulfil their supervisory obligations
adequately with respect to all foreign bank establishments operating in their
territories. Problems may also arise where the host authority considers that super-
vision of the parent institutions of foreign bank establishments operating in its
territory is inadequate or nonexistent. 15 9 The Concordats address ways super-
visory gaps can be prevented by providing that the responsibilities of host and
parent authorities are both complementary and overlapping.160 The Concordats
also emphasize that adequate supervision requires close contact and cooperation
among bank supervisory authorities. The Committee also recommended that host
supervisors judge their counterpart's parent supervision,16I and that the parent
authority satisfy itself that it will receive regular information on the operation and
condition of overseas offices before permitting their opening.'62 Though these
measures were designed to ensure coverage of all gaps that might exist in the
supervisory process, the possibility that overlapping authority may create diffi-
culties was recognized. 163
159. In such cases the host authority is expected to discourage or forbid the operation in its territory
of such foreign establishments. Alternatively, the host authority may impose specific conditions
governing the conduct of the business of such establishments. U.S. agencies solicit a general descrip-
tion of the powers and functions of home countries supervisors and require U.S. branches of foreign
banks seeking insurance to identify: the frequency, scope, and purpose of supervisory examinations
of banks in the parent country; the nature of lender-of-last-resort supporting existing in the parent
country; and the parent's country's regulatory standards for capital adequacy, liquidity, foreign
exchange exposure, risk concentration, and insider transactions. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: U.S. SUPERVISION AND INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY PRINCI-
PLES at 26 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. BANKING SUPERVISION].
160. Host authorities are responsible for the foreign bank establishments operating in their territo-
ries as individual institutions while parent authorities are responsible for them as parts of larger
banking groups where a general supervisory responsibility exists in respect of their worldwide
consolidated activities. The Concordats also emphasize that adequate supervision requires close
contact and cooperation among bank supervisory authorities.
161. Host authorities are encouraged to contact the parent supervisory authority upon receipt of a
bank's application to establish an office in its country, both to foster future cooperation in supervising
the bank and its new foreign office, and to enable the host authority to ensure that the parent authority
is aware of and has given formal authorization for the foreign office. Host authorities should also
identify the means and extent to which the parent and its proposed office are supervised by the parent
authority. United States banking practices are generally consistent with these principles. U.S. BANK-
ING SUPERVISION, supra note 159.
162. If the supervisor of the country where the head office of a credit institution is established
wished to verify information on a credit institution established in another Member State, he must
request the competent authorities of that Member State to perform the verification. These authorities
can comply with this request by either I) performing the verification themselves, 2) allowing the
foreign supervisor to verify the information or 3) allowing the verification to be performed by a
chartered accountant or another expert. Muller, A Legal Framework for International Supervision:
The EEC Model, ISSUES IN BANK REG., Summ. 1984, at 36, 39.
163. For example, efforts by the Federal Reserve System to secure consolidated information on
U.S. located offices of foreign banks and the overseas parent company were considered by the
supervisory authorities in other countries as being contrary to the Concordat.
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One important component of coordinated supervision is the principle of con-
solidated supervision, which is that parent banks and parent supervisory au-
thorities should evaluate the risk exposure of the totality of the banks of banking
groups for which they are responsible wherever that business is conducted. 164 The
principle rests on the understanding that banking supervisory authorities cannot
be fully satisfied about the soundness of individual banks unless they examine the
totality of each bank's worldwide business. The significance of adopting the
principle of consolidation is the implicit understanding that operations emanating
from one sector of the world banking market may affect stability in several other
related markets. Though the implementation of the principle of consolidated
supervision presupposes that parent banks and parent authorities have access to
relevant information about the operations of their banks, foreign establishments,
it also presupposes responsibility on the part of parent authorities.
From these general, aspirational principles, consensus on more concrete pol-
icy issues, particularly capital adequacy standards, has grown. The 1982 debt
crisis was a major stimulating factor in the rapidly developing "loan-securitiza-
tion" vehicles, 65 and other innovations in capital, balance sheet, and risk man-
agement policies. These innovations required a new view of how capital
adequacy should be measured, 66 as banks eventually began to innovate around
these constraints.167 Regulators found difficulties, however, in arriving at a com-
mon standard of capital adequacy because the concept of capital adequacy is a
product of different banking, accounting, and legal systems.16 While there was
some commonality, there were also marked differences in specific practices and
concepts. 169
The initial developments in harmonizing capital adequacy standards focused
on common measurement schemes, based on defensible mathematical principles,
that are generally accepted in an international context. A recent proposal for
relating minimum capital requirements to risk profiles of banking organizations,
developed jointly by representatives of the Bank of England, the U.S. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Reserve Board, (and recently Jap-
anese authorities) illustrates cooperation between governments that can enhance
164. Parental supervision on a consolidated basis is needed for two reasons: because the solvency
of parent banks cannot be adequately judged without taking account of all their foreign establish-
ments; and because the condition of the parent is influenced by the condition of their foreign
subsidiaries.
165. Logan, The Securitization of U.S. Bank Activities in the Eurodollar Market - Issues for U.S.
Counsel, II N.C.J. INT'L L & COMM. REG. 537 (1986).
166. See generally Gardener, supra note 150.
167. Another related problem is that sales of bank assets - taking assets off the balance sheet in
order to help improve or consolidate capital ratios - invariably involve the least risky (most
marketable) assets held by a bank. This may help capital ratios in the short run, but increase bank
riskiness in the longer term.
168. Gardener, supra note 150, at 36-38.
169. Id. at 32-36.
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global regulation of financial markets through the adoption of uniform rules. 7 0
The principles of this proposal were refined and recast by the members of the
Basel Committee in December of 1987. It is anticipated that the initial proposals
will benefit from additional fundamental and applied research on banking risk,
and the development of new internationally accepted accounting disclosure rules
for banks.'17
B. Implementation of Coordinated Supervision
The process by which banking regulations have been harmonized may be used
to harmonize securities laws. 172 Like banking regulators, securities regulators are
confronted with the Euromarkets (a largely unregulated market) and a diversity
of national laws in need of harmonization. The response to the Euromarkets need
not be additional regulations, for though not directly regulated by a single na-
tional government, market requirements, exchange restrictions, and indirect reg-
ulations 173 create a minimum level of disclosure in the Euromarkets.17 4
However, because wholly unregulated capital markets fail to achieve some
desired objectives for which there is an international consensus, and because of
the possibility of degenerating into inadequately lax standards, a reduction in
national barriers must be complemented by an increase in international
cooperation.
The Commission has sought to harmonize the securities laws in order to
reduce unnecessary barriers to the movement of capital. 17 One of the precondi-
170. The original proposal was released for public comment on January 24, 1986. See Capital
Maintenance, supra note 65; Extension of Time to Comment, supra note 65.
171. Gardener, supra note 150, at 39.
172. The principles of coordinated supervision have immediate application to other problems
confronting the commission. One of the important issues raised relating to internationalization of
securities markets is supervision of U.S. broker-dealers operating in more than one national jurisdic-
tion. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at V-38. The Commission lacks the authority to examine and
regulate the activities of unregistered overseas affiliates of U.S. registered broker-dealers, and has
found it extremely difficult to trace the movements of funds and securities necessary to reconstruct
transactions between affiliates, and has taken measures to alleviate this problem. See Financial
Responsibility Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 24553, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,132 (June 4, 1987). The problems of accommodating U.S. requirements to foreign
broker-dealers might also be ameliorated by a system of reciprocal recognition of international
broker-dealers with other national securities regulators. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at V-49.
173. Each participant is subject to the securities laws of its country of residence or other countries
asserting jurisdiction.
174. See SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-40. The comprehensiveness of this disclosure undoubt-
edly has been influenced by United States laws and policies. See id. at 111-41.
175. The myriad blue sky laws presents a great challenge to harmonization. See Annual Con-
ference on Uniformity of Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 6620, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,957 (Jan. 21, 1986). The interaction of state and local tax
systems is an analogous problem in tax laws. Most states and some localities impose an individual
income tax, some more expansively than others. See Montgomery, Worldwide Unitary Taxation:
Federal and State Developments, 20 INT'L LAW. 1049 (1986).
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tions to more uniform international disclosure standards is an internationally
accepted system of accounting to produce comparative financial statements and
financial disclosure. Differences in accounting principles, auditing standards,
and auditor independence standards are the major impediments to U.S. offerings
by foreign issuers. Because the accounting principles and auditing standards are
at the core of the disclosure system, accommodation of foreign standards and
practice has been limited pending evolution of international accounting and audit-
ing standards. Several private organizations, most notably the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee (IASC), are working on such standards. 17 6
The U.S. is a member of several organizations which are exploring the harmo-
nization of disclosure and financial reporting standards. 17 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recommended guidelines
for multinational enterprises in "Minimum Disclosure Rules Applicable to all
Publicly Offered Securities". 7 Though the U.S. is not a member, the European
Economic Community (EEC) also has worked to harmonize disclosure law. The
EEC guidelines include the Listing directive (intended to create uniform condi-
tions for the admission of a security to stock exchanges), the Prospectus direc-
tive, and the Interim Reports directive (requiring regular publication of
information about companies whose shares are listed).17 9 The EEC has also
issued guidelines on annual accounting ("fourth directive"- 1978) and has pro-
posed directives on group accounts ("seventh directive") and on auditing prac-
tices ("eighth directive").
The Commission staff has met informally with Japanese and Canadian se-
curities regulators to discuss the possibility of reciprocal arrangements with
foreign governments to allow mutual funds registered in one country to sell their
shares in the other country without meeting additional compliance measures. As
an alternative to negotiating a separate agreement with each interested nation, the
Commission staff is exploring the possibility of achieving reciprocity for the sale
of fund shares by an agreement with an international organization such as the
EEC or the OECD.1 0
176. See Acceptable Worldwide Accounting Standards Still Far Off, 70 Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) K-I (Apr. 14, 1987).
177. Among them, the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations ("UN"). The
UN projbosals include a report of a group of experts on international standards of accounting and
reporting. U.N. COMM'N ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS., INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTING
AND REPORTING FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS at 13, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/33, U.N. Sales No.
E.77.11.A. 17 (1977).
178. O.E.C.D. COMM. ON FIN. MKTS. ,OECD MINIMUM DISCLOSURE RULES APPLICABLE TO
ALL PUBLICLY OFFERED SECURITIES (1976).
179. Lorenz, EEC Law and Other Problems in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multinational
Offerigns to the U.K., 21 INT'L LAW. 795, 810-13 (1987).
180. See SEC REPORT, supra note I, at VI-18. The EEC Council Directive 85/611/EEC "on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities (UCITS)" (the "Directive"), 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 375) 3
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Because of the rapidly expanding international securities markets,'' in Febru-
ary 1985, the Commission published a concept release soliciting public comment
on methods of harmonizing disclosure and distribution practices for multinational
offerings by non-governmental issuers. 82 To help structure public comment, the
Commission published two approaches designed to facilitate such multinational
offerings: (1) an agreement that a prospectus accepted in an issuer's domicile
would be accepted for offerings in participating countries if it meets pre-agreed
standards ("reciprocal approach"); and (2) the development of a common pros-
pectus which would be filed with each participating country's respective se-
curities administrators ("common prospectus approach"). The Commission
requested commentators to express their views regarding which of these ap-
proaches, or alternative approaches, would be practical and consistent with inves-
tor protection. 183
Seventy commentators responded to the issues raised by the concept release.
Substantially all of the commentators addressing the issue of the best approach to
facilitate multi-national offerings favored the reciprocal approach, at least on an
evolutionary basis. Twenty-one of the commentators considered the common
prospectus approach ideal. However, the commentators were skeptical, believing
that its implementation would be costly, subject to substantial time delays and, as
a practical matter, difficult to achieve because of differences in standards,
customs, and procedures. 14
The Commission found little evidence to suggest that U.S. distribution costs,
(1986), and the "Standard Rules for the Operations of Institutions for Collective Investment in
Securities" (the "Standard Rules") proposed by the OECD could serve as the basis for such a
reciprocal arrangement. However neither the Directive nor the Standard Rules provide a regulatory
framework directly comparable to that of the Investment Company Act. Therefore, any negotiations
for a reciprocal agreements based on either the Directive or the Standard Rules would have to address
the differences between those regulatory guidelines and the Investment Company Act. The SEC
report suggests that any reciprocal treaty should seek to ensure that U.S. investors in foreign
companies selling shares in the United States receive protection that is comparable to that received by
investors in investment companies organized in the U.S. and operated in accordance with the ICA,
and that U.S. investment companies are not placed at a competitive disadvantage to foreign invest-
ment companies, whether in the United States or abroad.
181. See Osborn, The Rise of International Equity, EUROMONEY, May 1984 at 63. See also SEC
Seeks Comments On Internationalization, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Apr. 15, 1985, at 4.
182. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6568,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,743 (February 28, 1985). In April 1985,
the Commission issued a release asking for comments on other aspects of the internationalization of
the securities markets. Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the Worls
Securitites Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 21,958 [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,759 (Apr. 18, 1985). To encourage consideration of ways of attaining the fairest and
most efficient global secondary markets, the Commission solicited comment on what conditions and
structures should characterize international trading markets and the comparison, clearance and settle-
ment of resulting international trades. Id.
183. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at IV-49.
184. Id. at IV-50.
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the U.S. reconciliation requirement, the segment profit and loss information
requirement, or U.S. audit requirements constitute a serious impediment to for-
eign issuers raising capital in U.S. markets. 85
The Commission has chosen to adopt the reciprocal approach initially. A
noteworthy feature of the reciprocal approach is the adoption of the principle that
a nation refrains from applying national regulations if the legislation in the other
country is adequate, a principle underlying coordinated supervision.
With the experience of international banking as a guide, in the short term the
experiences under the reciprocal approach, and the consultations among nations
should provide the impetus for harmonizing legislation between the U.S., the
United Kingdom, and Japan. The progress in uniform accounting standards
should facilitate harmonization.
It is possible that empirical research in certain areas will be required to deter-
mine appropriate disclosure standards for the international securities markets.
Without objective, empirical evidence on how to proceed, fear of compromising
competitive positions can lead to compromise in standards causing regulation to
degenerate to the level of the nation with the least stringent requirements. To
prevent this scenario internationally recognized principles of securities regulation
must be formulated and adhered to.
The experience of banking indicates that the best framework for cooperation is
not a rigid system which binds each member nations but a loose, aspirational
185. Id. at IV-50-54. In January 1986, the Commission released a staff summary of the 30
comments received in response to the Global Trading Release. Summary of Comments on Concept
Release Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings by the SEC Division of Corporate Finance,
SEC Release No. 33-6568, S 7-9-85 (on file with the SEC). Commentators viewed the tendency for
securities to be traded outside their market of origin and for investors to seek investment opportunities
in foreign securities or markets as a positive development. Commentators also recognized that the
Commission has an important role to play in the internationalization process, but generally cautioned
that international trading markets should be allowed to develop further on their own without extensive
involvement of the Commission at this point. Commentators did indicate, however, that the facilita-
tion of intermarket trading linkages and international clearance and settlement facilities was an
appropriate area for Commission action. Commentators also suggested that the Commission might
play a useful role in encouraging agreement among the active trading markets regarding minimum
standards for automated clearance and settlement systems. The Commission considered the Release
and comment summary at a public meeting in May 1986, and endorsed the view of commentators that
it should proceed cautiously in responding to the growth of transnational trading.
On February 17, 1987, the Commission conducted a Rountable Discussion on Internationalization.
Poor Stock Settlement Systems Seen Hampering International Stock Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 248 (Feb. 20, 1987). The participants concluded that: (1) international trading markets are
expanding and are largely institutional, although home country markets will remain the primary and
most liquid markets, particularly for equities; (2) the Commission should not impose regulatory
solutions but should facilitate appropriate developments in the market; (3) international clearance and
settlement is the largest single problem in this area; and (4) information and surveillance sharing
among regulators and markets is crucial.
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systems operating with informal consultations." 6 International banking au-
thorities do not strive towards the creation of one supranational banking authority.
The national authorities instead seek to achieve harmonization of the present
forms of supervision, international cooperation between supervisory authorities
and, as a result of the implementation of the principle of consolidation, supervi-
sion that transcends national borders.
The existence of overriding legal instruments, similar to EEC Directives,'87 are
not necessary preconditions to integrated legislation. 88 It can, however, be antici-
pated that in the long term, consultations and cooperations will increasingly
become formalized, to the point where nations agree to certain codified
principles.
186. Basle Concordats do not have binding legal force, as they relate to an international banking
system which is itself not governed by the provision of a single legal regime. This is an inevitable
feature but one that does not weaken the commitment to the principles set out in the agreement. The
members of the Offshore Supervisors Group representing all the major offshore centers worldwide
were involved in the discussions leading up to the revised concordat and this Group was able to
welcome and endorse its content at the time of its publication. Many other supervisory authorities
have also done so since publication. The principles set out in the report are not necessarily embodied
in the laws of the countries represented on the Committee. Rather they are recommended guidelines
of best practices in this area, which all members have undertaken to work towards implementing,
according to the means available to them. Article 6(a) of the Consolidation Directive, for similar
reasons stipulates that the application of the principle of consolidation must be based on reciprocity in
bilateral agreements between the competent authorities of the Member State and of a third country.
187. Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, Directives are instruments of the Community legislator
which "shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be achieved,
while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means." Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. See also Article 2, EEC Treaty
(Objective of Treaty). This aim is complemented by Articles 52 to 66 of the EEC Treaty, which
require liberalization of restrictions on establishment and services. See also the Council Directive of
June 23, 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services in respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions. 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 194) 1 (1973).
188. The first Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions was
an attempt to realize coordination through one all-embracing coordination directive. A draft for such
a directive was presented to the Commission in 1972 but never made it to the EEC Council. Member
States, disapproved of a system of concretely harmonized directives. From such a response, the
Commission abandoned a comprehensive proposal and instead opted for gradual convergence of
national directives on general principles. Progress was made fairly rapidly on the implementation of
the principle of consolidated supervision. On June 13, 1983, the council of Ministers approved a
Council Directive on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, 26 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 193) 18 (1973), which was confined to non-controversial general points of departure
prescribes that the supervision of credit institutions that have a participation of more than 50% in
another credit or financial institution should be on a consolidated basis. The Directive consequently
requires the Member States to eliminate all legal obstacles to the exchange of information necessary
for consolidation. Id. at 19-20.
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CONCLUSION
The recent experience of regulators in globalized and internationalized capital
markets ultimately illustrate the futility of unilateral measures. To succeed, reg-
ulation strategies must be predicated on harmonized approaches which do not
interfere with efficient utilization of capital. In the transition to harmonized
regulations, national policies should seek capital neutrality, particularly inter-
nations neutrality. By also following the process and principle of coordinating
supervision in the Commission's implementation of the reciprocal prospectus
approach, the resulting international cooperation will lead to formalized, codified
principles of appropriate disclosure standards.
